Biometric authentication on iPhone and Android: Usability, perceptions, and influences on adoption by BHAGAVATULA, Rasekhar et al.
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Information Systems School of Information Systems
2-2015
Biometric authentication on iPhone and Android:








Singapore Management University, monkywe.su.2011@phdis.smu.edu.sg
Lorrie Faith CRANOR
Carnegie Mellon University
See next page for additional authors
DOI: https://doi.org/10.14722/usec.2015.23003
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research
Part of the Information Security Commons
This Conference Proceeding Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Information Systems at Institutional Knowledge at
Singapore Management University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Information Systems by an authorized
administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
BHAGAVATULA, Rasekhar; UR, Blase; IACOVINO, Kevin; KYWE, Su Mon; CRANOR, Lorrie Faith; and SAVVIDES, Marios.
Biometric authentication on iPhone and Android: Usability, perceptions, and influences on adoption. (2015). USEC ’15: Workshop on
Usable Security, 8 February 2015, San Diego, CA: Proceedings. 1-10. Research Collection School Of Information Systems.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3967
Author
Rasekhar BHAGAVATULA, Blase UR, Kevin IACOVINO, Su Mon KYWE, Lorrie Faith CRANOR, and
Marios SAVVIDES
This conference proceeding article is available at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University:
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sis_research/3967
Biometric Authentication on iPhone and Android:
Usability, Perceptions, and Influences on Adoption
Chandrasekhar Bhagavatula, Blase Ur, Kevin Iacovino, Su Mon Kywe†, Lorrie Faith Cranor, Marios Savvides
Carnegie Mellon University, †Singapore Management University
{cbhagava, bur, kiacovin, lorrie, marioss}@andrew.cmu.edu, †monkywe.su.2011@smu.edu.sg
Abstract—While biometrics have long been promoted as the
future of authentication, the recent introduction of Android
face unlock and iPhone fingerprint unlock are among the first
large-scale deployments of biometrics for consumers. In a 10-
participant, within-subjects lab study and a 198-participant
online survey, we investigated the usability of these schemes,
along with users’ experiences, attitudes, and adoption decisions.
Participants in our lab study found both face unlock and
fingerprint unlock easy to use in typical scenarios. The notable
exception was that face unlock was completely unusable in a
dark room. Most participants preferred fingerprint unlock over
face unlock or a PIN. In our survey, most fingerprint unlock
users perceived it as more secure and convenient than a PIN.
In contrast, face unlock users had mixed experiences, and many
had stopped using it. We conclude with design recommendations
for biometric authentication on smartphones.
I. INTRODUCTION
Researchers have proposed the use of biometrics for au-
thentication, citing advantages like users not having to carry
or remember anything [1], [2]. Biometrics could thus avoid
common pitfalls with passwords like forgetting them or writing
them down. Despite these advantages, the wide-scale adoption
of biometrics has seemed just around the corner for decades.
However, the introduction of Android 4.0’s face unlock at
the end of 2011 [3] and the iPhone 5S’ Touch ID (termed fin-
gerprint unlock in this paper) two years later [4] has suddenly
brought biometric authentication to the masses. For many
users, this is their first real interaction with a biometric security
system, and we therefore investigated why they did or did not
choose to adopt these biometric systems for authentication. We
also wished to study the real-world usability of these systems
in both controlled settings and day-to-day life. Notably, users’
expectations may derive from what they have seen in movies
and the media as to the reliability and usability of such
systems. To explore the usability of these schemes, as well
as users’ perceptions and attitudes about them, we conducted
a laboratory usability study and an online survey.
In a within-subjects laboratory usability study, our ten
participants found Android face unlock and iPhone fingerprint
unlock to be easy to use in a number of common usage
scenarios. The most notable exception was that no participant
successfully authenticated with face unlock in a dark room.
Contrary to our expectations, fingerprint unlock was relatively
robust to hands covered in moisturizer. In a comparative
ranking, most participants preferred iPhone fingerprint unlock
over Android face unlock or traditional PINs.
Whereas our lab study focused on usability in specific sce-
narios, our 198-participant online survey investigated partici-
pants’ experiences using these schemes in everyday life. The
survey also delved into their perception of the convenience,
security, and benefits of each platform, as well as their rationale
for adopting or not adopting that scheme. The majority of
respondents with an iPhone 5S reported that they currently
used fingerprint unlock to authenticate and had very positive
perceptions of the scheme’s security. While some participants
reported issues using fingerprint unlock with dirty hands,
participants overwhelmingly perceived fingerprint unlock as
more convenient than a PIN.
In contrast, few users of compatible Android phones said
they currently used face unlock, though a handful had tried
and subsequently abandoned it. These participants were less
enthused than their iPhone counterparts about biometric au-
thentication. In particular, authenticating in situations with dim
lighting had caused problems for a number of users.
Our results suggest that iPhone fingerprint unlock is much
closer to large-scale adoption than Android face unlock, yet
both systems suffer from usability flaws. Throughout the paper,
we make recommendations for improving both schemes’ us-
ability. We conclude with general design recommendations and
future directions for biometric authentication on smartphones.
II. RELATED WORK
Researchers have argued that the usability of biometric sys-
tems is of paramount importance and that usability is a crucial
element in users’ adoption decisions [5], [6]. Despite their
advantages, biometric schemes have failed to see large-scale
adoption in part due to usability issues; as a result, biometrics
seem to remain the “perennial technology of tomorrow” [7].
The literature on biometric authentication is vast, yet most
work focuses on purely technical aspects of biometric systems.
Traditional performance measures for biometric systems only
measure system-level errors and not the errors caused by
human interaction, providing an unrealistic perspective on
usability [8]. Furthermore, it is crucial to consider the entire
ecosystem in which the biometric technology is used [9].
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A handful of researchers have conducted usability studies
of biometric systems. In contrast to the systems we investigate,
none of the biometric systems studied by other researchers
have seen large-scale adoption by average consumers. Though
they studied systems distinct from the ones we investigate, we
adopt a number of their methods. Notably, taking into account
focus groups, lab studies, and field trials of iris verification
for ATMs, researchers have found a major distinction between
users’ attitudes towards biometrics prior to and following use
of the technology [10]. We therefore focus on post-usage
attitudes in our studies. Similarly, researchers have found
that system responsiveness impacts the overall experience of
biometrics [11], leading us to consider perceptions of overall
system performance. Furthermore, researchers have argued that
the design and evaluation of biometric systems should focus on
traditional HCI dimensions like efficiency and satisfaction [12].
Like us, a handful of researchers have compared biometric
authentication systems. For example, Trewin et al. compared
face recognition, voice recognition, and gesture authentication
to passwords on mobile devices [13]. They found critical
usability flaws in all biometric mechanisms. Braz and Robert
also comparatively analyzed many schemes, including face,
fingerprint, and iris authentication [14]. They found the us-
ability of all mechanisms lacking. In field trials with different
biometric authentication schemes, Lassmann found iris recog-
nition to be most usable, followed by fingerprint and face
recognition [15]. Other studies have focused exclusively on
the usability of fingerprint biometrics, finding that younger
users and male users found fingerprint authentication more
usable [16]. In contrast to the specialized mechanisms these
researchers studied, we focus on off-the-shelf systems that have
recently become widely available to average consumers.
User perception of a biometric scheme’s usability is also a
major factor in adoption. In their survey of fifteen biometric
authentication schemes, Jain et al. identified acceptability of
a biometric system as the driving force in that system’s suc-
cess [17]. They noted face recognition as one of six biometrics
they believe has “high” user acceptability, whereas they believe
fingerprint recognition has “medium” user acceptability. In our
studies, however, we found that participants preferred iPhone
fingerprint unlock over Android face unlock.
A number of researchers have studied overall perceptions
of biometrics, yet not the consumer systems we study. Less
than a decade ago, researchers found most study participants
to be unfamiliar with biometrics or to lack interest in those
technologies [18]. Even survey responsents who are open to
using biometric systems can be wary about security, such as
the possibility of using a photograph to fool a face-recognition
system [19]. In contrast to perceptions about face recognition,
researchers have found study participants perceive fingerprint
authentication as both highly secure and highly usable [20].
User perception also impacts adoption [21]. Notably,
reasearchers have found the acceptance of a fingerprint authen-
tication system to change based on context (personal versus
purchasing) [22]. Subtle issues in deployment, like the height
of face scanners and the hygiene of fingerprint scanners, also
have a major impact on perception and therefore adoption [23].
Although we are the first to investigate the biometric
systems for unlocking iPhone and Android smartphones, two
recent studies have investigated smartphone unlock behaviors
using traditional authentication mechanisms. One group of
researchers found that users spend a lot of time unnecessarily
unlocking their phone and that many users fail to perceive any
threat to the data on their phone [24]. The other group also
found a strong correlation between locking behaviors and a
user’s perception of the risks, albeit a perception the authors
believe underestimates actual dangers [25]. While smartphone
users’ perceptions of risk and attitudes towards locking their
phone are implicit in our own study, we instead focus on the
iPhone and Android biometric unlock mechanisms, which have
not previously been studied.
III. LAB USABILITY STUDY
The first phase of our investigation was a within-subjects
usability study of smartphone authentication mechanisms. In
our lab, each participant used PINs, Android face unlock, and
iPhone fingerprint unlock in five typical usage scenarios. While
participants had great difficulty authenticating in a dark room
using face unlock, most participants authenticated easily using
fingerprint unlock with freshly moisturized hands, which we
had expected to be challenging. We note a number of subtle
usability issues with the schemes we tested.
A. Methodology
In April 2014 we conducted a within-subjects usability
study of four unlock mechanisms: Android face unlock, iPhone
fingerprint unlock, Android PIN unlock, and iPhone PIN
unlock. We chose these schemes because they represent the
biometric authentication mechanisms most widely supported
on each platform at the time of research. When we began our
study, no major Android model had a dedicated fingerprint
sensor like the iPhone 5S. While Samsung later introduced
a model with a dedicated fingerprint sensor [26] and though
some third-party apps use the Android camera to simulate
a fingerprint sensor, Android still does not widely support
fingerprint authentication at the time of press. Similarly, while
some third-party apps can unlock the iPhone through face
recognition, Apple does not natively support this scheme at
the time of press. We chose to use PINs as a baseline for
comparison due to the ubiquity of PIN-based authentication.
Each participant came to our lab and used phones we
provided to set up each unlock mechanism and then use the
mechanism under five typical usage scenarios. The study took
about one hour to complete. We compensated participants $10.
1) Study Structure: The study comprised a survey of demo-
graphics and opinions, a series of interactive tasks, and an in-
terview. We began with a survey that collected the participants’
demographics and prior experiences with smartphones and
biometric systems. We also queried participants’ perception of
biometrics by asking them to rate their agreement with various
statements about biometrics on a 5-point Likert scale. We were
interested in these attitudes because users’ initial perceptions
may impact their willingness to try biometric authentication.
Participants then authenticated using a PIN code and the
predominant biometric scheme on each platform. In particular,
they used fingerprint unlock on an iPhone 5s, face unlock
on a Samsung Galaxy S4, and PIN unlock on each phone.





it to be more convenient and more secure than a PIN, whereas
former face unlock users had very mixed opinions about the
scheme’s security and convenience. A number of face unlock
users noted issues with using it in the dark.
In contrast, the majority of our iPhone 5S survey par-
ticipants currently used fingerprint unlock, overwhelmingly
perceiving it as more secure and more convenient than a PIN.
Whereas few participants in our lab study had difficulty using
fingprint unlock even after applying moisturizer, many survey
participants reported issues authenticating with dirty or greasy
hands. Alarmingly, a sizable fraction of fingerprint unlock
users noted the convenience of the scheme for authenticating
while driving an automobile.
A. Methodology
We recruited owners of a phone supporting biometric au-
thentication. In particular, owners of Android phones running
version 4.0+ of the operating system and owners of the iPhone
5S were eligible. We restricted our survey to owners of those
phones because we were only interested in the impressions
and adoption decisions of users whose phones already support
biometric authentication. We chose to include users of these
phones who had never used biometric authentication because
we were curious why they had chosen not to adopt these
schemes. As with our laboratory study, at the time of our
research and the time of press, Android did not widely support
fingerprint unlock and the iPhone did not natively support
face unlock. As a result, we asked iPhone owners only about
fingerprint unlock and Android users only about face unlock.
Following the online consent process, we asked about
demographics and general phone unlock behaviors, building
upon questions from prior work on phone unlocking [24],
[25]. We also gauged participants’ familiarity with biometric
authentication features on their smartphone. Based on the
participant’s familiarity with these features, as well as their
status as a current user, former user, or non-user, the remain-
ing survey questions followed a branching approach tailoring
questions to their prior experiences. To discourage biased re-
sponses designed to game the survey, this branching generated
approximately the same number of questions regardless of the
branching. To provide a baseline understanding of biometric
authentication, we showed all participants a brief description of
their phone’s biometric authentication system regardless of the
participant’s stated familiarity with biometric authentication.
We asked current users of biometric authentication why
they used it, what advantages and disadvantages they had
noticed compared to other schemes, and what issues, if any,
they had encountered. For iPhone fingerprint unlock, we asked
if they had run into issues while seated, while walking, or
in any other situation. For Android face unlock, we asked if
they had encountered any issues at night, indoors, or in any
other situation. If the participant had previously used biometric
authentication, yet had stopped, we asked the same questions
in the past tense, along with questions about why they had
stopped using the scheme. We asked participants who said they
had never used their phone’s biometric authentication scheme
why they had not, what they perceived to be advantageous
and disadvantageous about the scheme, and what, if anything,
might make them choose to use such a scheme.
If the participant had ever used the biometric authentication
scheme on their phone, we asked participants to respond
to a series of statements on 5-point Likert scales. These
questions gauged whether biometric authentication took more
or less time, resulted in more or fewer errors, were more or
less convenient, and seemed more or less secure than their
current or previous authentication scheme. We also asked them
to elaborate on specific scenarios in which they found the
biometric scheme to be more or less convenient, as well as
listing any scenarios in which they had seen someone fool the
biometric authentication scheme.
We compensated participants $1.00 for the survey, which
took an average of 9 minutes to complete. We excluded
participants who failed to verify ownership of an appropriate
phone, as described below.
1) Recruitment: We recruited on Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) crowdsourcing service for a survey on smart-
phone usage. We restricted the survey to MTurkers age 18+
and located in the U.S. who had completed at least 50 tasks
with an approval rating of 95%+. We stated that the survey
was open only to current users of Android 4.0+ or the iPhone
5S, the models that support face unlock and fingerprint unlock.
To ascertain that we only surveyed users whose current
phones support biometric authentication, we included a ques-
tion to verify the participant’s ownership of an appropriate
phone. For the iPhone 5S, we asked participants to type exactly
what is written as the two options for Touch ID in “Settings →
General → Touch ID & Passcode -> Touch ID on your iPhone
5S.” We asked Android participants to enter the third unlocking
scheme listed in “Settings → My Device → Lock Screen →
Screen Lock along with the security level listed underneath.”
Unlike the iPhone, which had only one set of correct answers,
we accepted as valid any answer that contained “face unlock”
or “face and voice.” The precise wording varied based on the
Android phone model and service provider.
We initially recruited 100 participants for the Android
survey and another 100 participants for the iPhone survey. As
we discuss in the results, few of the Android respondents had
ever used face unlock. Therefore, we reopened the survey, but
instead advertised it prominently as only for current or former
users of “Android face unlock.”
2) Analysis: Our survey was not a controlled experiment,
so we do not perform any statistical comparisons. Instead, we
report the frequencies of participants’ perceptions, attitudes,
and adoption decisions. While some survey questions were
multiple choice, we included 28 open-ended questions across
the different branches of the survey to delve into participants’
attitudes. To analyze open-ended responses, members of the
research team read through all responses and iteratively devel-
oped a codebook on a per-question basis. The number of codes
per question varied, but ranged from two to fourteen. Two
coders independently applied these codes. Across all questions
on both surveys, their percentage agreement was 87.4%. The
coders discussed disagreements and came to consensus; we
report these consensus codes.
From the Likert-scale data, we report perceptions of secu-
rity and convenience for each of the biometric authentication
schemes versus baseline PIN authentication. Since we wanted




Nevertheless, over 90% of current fingerprint unlock users
found fingerprint unlock to be a lot or a little more convenient
than a PIN, as shown in Figure 12. In fact, 40 of the 61
current users (66%) cited fingerprint unlock’s convenience
as the scheme’s single biggest advantage. Given that these
responses all came from current users of fingerprint unlock, the
scheme’s overall convenience seems to outweigh the situations
in which the sensor does not read the finger correctly.
When asked to relate a scenario in which fingerprint unlock
was more convenient than alternative authentication schemes,
12 current users (20%) specifically mentioned using fingerprint
unlock while driving. This convenience could be a potential
safety hazard; if fingerprint unlock makes using a phone too
convenient, people may be tempted to use their phone more
while driving. That said, most of these participants mentioned
liking that fingerprint unlock distracts them less than other
authentication schemes while driving. For instance, P-I79 calls
out the advantages of fingerprint unlock “when driving, so I
don’t need to look down on my phone.” While it may be a
positive that drivers do not need to take their eyes off the road
to unlock their phone, it is not clear whether they are able to
use their phones subsequently without looking at them.
D. Former Users of iPhone Fingerprint Unlock
Sixteen participants (18%) had tried fingerprint unlock, yet
decided not to continue using it. Although our Android and
iPhone samples are distinct and therefore cannot be used to
reach any definitive conclusions beyond observations, iPhone
fingerprint unlock appears to have a much higher retention
rate than Android face unlock. Eleven of these 16 participants
(69%) stated that they had originally tried fingerprint unlock
out of curiosity because it was a new Apple feature.
As with face unlock, the most common reason given for
discontinuing use was that fingerprint unlock performed unre-
liably (7 participants, 44%). We did not observe a consensus
toward any other reason for abandoning fingerprint unlock. We
hypothesize that some users merely tired of it. For example,
P-I24 stated, “I just tested it and just do not think about it,”
while P-I115 stated, “Because I started being at home all day
and didn’t need [authentication].”
Surprisingly, as shown in Figure 11, every former user of
fingerprint unlock felt that fingerprint unlock was at least as
secure as a PIN. However, these former users had far more
mixed opinions about convenience, as shown in Figure 12.
Many former users thought the best thing about fingerprint
unlock was that they did not have to remember anything,
which is true of all biometrics. Unfortunately echoing current
users, the most common scenario for which former users noted
fingerprint unlock’s convenience was its use while driving (5
participants, 31%).
E. People Who Have Never Used Fingerprint Unlock
The remaining 12 participants (13%) had never used fin-
gerprint unlock. We did not observe a strong consensus as to
why. Some participants were just not interested in configuring
the mechanism. However, a few participants stated that they
actively did not trust Apple with their biometric data. For ex-
ample, P-I49 wrote, “Although Apple states that the fingerprint
resides on the device and not uploaded into the cloud, I do not
trust it. I do not want to inadvertently share my biometric data
with the rest of the world.”
Unexpectedly, eight of these non-users (67%) said they
felt fingerprint unlock’s greatest advantage was security. This
contrasts sharply with the opinion of current and former users,
who far more commonly cited convenience as fingerprint
unlock’s primary benefit. We hypothesize these non-users are
not fully aware of fingerprint unlock’s convenience. Some non-
users, however, identified expectations of a high failure rate as
the primary reason for not using fingerprint unlock.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND DESIGN RECOMMENDATIONS
In both our lab usability study and online survey, we found
a mix of successes and failures in one of the first large-
scale deployments of biometric authentication for average
users. Convenience and usability were key factors in positive
adoption decisions, yet further improvements in usability could
go a long way in encouraging non-users to reconsider the
pros and cons of biometric authentication for their use cases.
Our online survey confirmed our intuition that a number of
prospective users have tried biometric authentication on their
new phones out of curiosity.
Whereas few participants in our online survey used An-
droid face unlock, iPhone fingerprint unlock seemed to enjoy
wide adoption. This difference in adoption may stem from
fingerprint unlock being perceived as faster, cooler, and more
accurate. Both mechanisms fail in specific scenarios, wet
fingers and dark rooms, respectively, yet fingerprint unlock
seemed to have been adopted at a much higher rate. We hy-
pothesize that these usability failures are not quite comparable,
however, because people will want to use their phone in a
dark area more often than when they have wet fingers. For
any biometric scheme, it is crucial that developers account
for the scenarios in which people often use their phone, and
usage in dimly lit or dark areas is common. While we did not
specifically ask about scenarios like using the phone in the
rain, vibrations from travel in a vehicle, or interference from
other people, no participants in either study brought up these
scenarios as issues in the free-response portion of the studies.
Usability issues were a major driver of users’ adoption
decisions. To spur adoption, Android face unlock in particular
could benefit from fixing its major usability flaw: unlocking
in low-light environments. While a radical refactoring of An-
droid’s approach to face unlock might automatically illuminate
the user’s face in the dark, perhaps even using infared light
to minimize interrupting the user, we have two simpler rec-
ommendations for improving face unlock. First, the ‘improve
face recognition’ option should be more obvious to users.
This option, intended to increase the reliability of the face
unlock scheme, could conceivably help in low-light scenarios,
but only if users take advantage of it during registration.
Second, the smartphone should detect automatically whether
face recognition has enough light to work. If it does not, the
phone should switch to the secondary authentication scheme
without requiring the user to attempt face recognition first.
Doing so may alleviate some of users’ frustration since they
will not have to wait for biometric authentication to fail before
falling back to the secondary mechanism.
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The iPhone fingerprint unlock could also benefit from
usability improvements, albeit in a more minor way. Even
though many survey participants said the fingerprint unlock
did not work when their fingers were wet, this shortcoming
did not cause many of them to stop using fingerprint unlock.
However, given some of the troubles observed in setting the
system up, we think the registration step could be improved.
We recommend a better explanation, perhaps through a video,
of what the participant should do and how long they should
press their finger down. Such instructions could remove some
of the ambiguity in the registration process.
Another notable takeaway from our studies was users’
perhaps overly optimistic perceptions of the security of bio-
metric authentication. In particular, despite assertions from
the smartphone operating systems that users should consider
enabling biometric authentication for convenience at the cost
of reduced security, participants generally considered biometric
authentication to be more secure than PIN codes. Objectively,
current implementations of biometric authentication cannot be
more secure than a PIN because a PIN can always be used as
a fallback mechanism. It is likely that participants considered
only the biometric authentication mechanism itself, and not
any fallback authentication method, when judging security.
However, unless biometric authentication were to become far
more robust, a fallback mechanism is necessary.
Furthermore, even though biometric systems can be fooled
with molds of fingerprints or photographs of a user [19],
few participants in our study were aware of these risks. It
is possible that users assume that something high tech is in-
herently more secure. More conspicuous notice of the security
properties of biometric authentication might disabuse users of
their misperceptions of security. Progress could also be made
in the opposite direction. Negative perceptions of the security
of biometric data itself impacted a handful of participants’
impressions of iPhone fingerprint unlock. In particular, worries
that biometric data would be sent to the cloud, rather than
constrained to the device itself, was a barrier to adoption for
some participants. While we did not observe evidence among
our participants of privacy concerns about face-recognition
data, one could imagine similar misgivings for face unlock.
The current availability of biometric authentication on
smartphones may signal that the day in which biometric
authentication is widely adopted is near. However, without
further attention to usability quirks and user perceptions of
these systems, barriers to adoption remain.
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